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The recent debate in Congress over patients’
rights and the regulation of managed care has been
predicated largely on a misunderstanding of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.
The misunderstanding is pervasive, shared by
members of Congress and by anti-managed-care
activists.
Although it is true that ERISA is an impor-
tant and vastly complex piece of legislation, it is
not true that health maintenance organizations
(HMOs) receive special protection from ERISA,
or that they are exempt from being held account-
able for medical errors because of ERISA.
In fact, HMOs are far less likely than are fee-
for-service plans to be self-funded and exempt
from state oversight. They are far more likely to
be subject to state-mandated benefits, solvency
requirements, appeals requirements, and consumer
protections than are self-funded “traditional” plans.
And, while all employer-based plans (whether
self-funded or fully insured, whether HMO or
indemnity) are exempt from state contract and
most tort laws, to the extent a plan “practices
medicine,” it is subject to state-based remedies
for malpractice.
ERISA might be ready for a change, or an out-
right repeal, but the current proposals don’t
begin to do that. In fact, they extend federal reg-
ulation to areas that have always been the
responsibility of the states. It would be comfort-
ing to know, before it enacts sweeping new leg-
islation, that Congress is acting with full knowl-
edge of the current problems rather than being
carried away in a tide of emotionalism. It
would also be reassuring to know that the
advocates of new legislation had fully consid-
ered the implications of a new federal role in
overseeing the practice of medicine.
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Introduction
It is hard for physicians to prescribe treat-
ments when they have the wrong diagnosis.
And it is hard for Congress to pass a good law
when the members misunderstand the prob-
lem. The current debate over the “Patients’
Bill of Rights” is an example of a remedy
gone wrong. The proponents want to “fix”
the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 to enable patients to sue their
health plans when the plans commit medical
malpractice. But, because the proposed solu-
tion is based on a misdiagnosis, the outcome
could worsen the disease. 
There may be no more widely misunder-
stood piece of legislation than ERISA. Even
people who are otherwise expert in health
policy have trouble understanding the intri-
cacies of this law. 
Some of the misunderstandings include
the ideas that
• ERISA applies only to self-funded
employers;
• HMOs have a special exemption from
law suits because of ERISA;
• patients can’t sue their health plans be-
cause of ERISA;
• HMOs have increased the amount of
self-funding by employers;
• the states are powerless to regulate
HMOs;
• all large employers are self-funded;
• self-funding is growing;
• ERISA was intended to apply only to
pensions; health care was an after-
thought; and
• crafty lawyers created loopholes based
on inexact legislative language.
All of those beliefs are mistaken. ERISA
certainly has had a major impact on the
financing of health care in the United States,
and it has been controversial ever since it
was enacted. It provides a federal framework
for employer benefit plans and eliminates
state authority to regulate those plans.
Central to the current debate, ERISA elimi-
nates most state-based “causes of action” and
replaces them with federal remedies. Whether
Congress should have preempted state law in
the first place and whether ERISA’s reme-
dies are still adequate 25 years later are both
important questions. But much of the current
debate is less about ERISA than it is about
growing anger that HMOs interfere with the
practice of medicine. It is not helpful that so
many people misunderstand what ERISA
does and does not do—especially when those
misunderstandings prompt Congress to write
remedial legislation.
The Law
As its name implies, ERISA was enacted
primarily to protect retirement income pro-
grams (i.e., pensions), but ERISA also covers
health care programs (“employee welfare
benefit plans”). An employee welfare benefit
plans is defined as
any plan, fund, or program . . . estab-
lished or maintained by an employer
or by an employee organization . . .
for the purpose of providing  for its
participants or their beneficiaries,
through the purchase of insurance
or otherwise, medical, surgical, or
hospital care or benefits, or benefits
in the event of sickness, accident, dis-
ability, death or unemployment.1
That definition applies to plans provided by
all employers (“any employer engaged in
commerce or in any industry or activity
affecting commerce”)2 except governmental
plans,3 church plans,4 and plans maintained
to comply with workers compensation or
unemployment compensation laws.5 In this
paper, “employer” plans do not include
church and governmental plans.
The purpose of ERISA was to allow em-
ployers to provide nationally uniform bene-
fits to all their employees at a time when the
states were beginning to enact laws with very
different requirements. To provide uniform
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benefits, employers wanted nationally consis-
tent standards in such areas as fiduciary
responsibilities, employee vesting, disclosure
of benefits, appeals procedures, and grievance
rights. ERISA was also designed to protect
the assets of employee benefit plans from
being depleted through litigation. Congress
fully intended to prevent state legislatures
from taxing those assets or controlling how
they would be invested or otherwise adminis-
tered.6
To allow for nationally consistent benefits
and regulations, Congress preempted state laws
that “relate to” employee benefit plans and
substituted federal requirements. The lan-
guage preempting state law is fairly clear. It
says, “[ERISA] shall supersede any and all
state laws insofar as they may now or here-
after relate to any employee benefit plan.”7
There have been disputes over the meaning
of “relate to,” but the courts have tended to
interpret the expression broadly and with
due consideration of the intent of Congress.
The preemption was not an accident. The
chairmen of the congressional committees with
jurisdiction over ERISA made it clear at the
time that they intended the preemption to
be very broad. Rep. John Dent (D-Pa.), chair-
man of the Subcommittee on Labor of the
House Labor and Education Committee, said
on the floor of the House, “I wish to make
note of what is to many the crowning
achievement of this legislation, the reserva-
tion to Federal authority the sole power to
regulate the field of employee benefit plans.”8
And Sen. Harrison Williams (D-N.J.), chair-
man of the Senate Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare, said, “This principle (of
federal preemption) is intended to apply in
its broadest sense to all actions of State or
local governments, or any instrumentality there-
of, which have the force or effect of law.”9
Although Congress intended to give the
federal government sole authority to regulate
employee benefit plans, it did not intend to
regulate the insurance industry. It had passed
the McCarran-Ferguson Act in 1946,1 0 giv-
ing the states sole jurisdiction over the regu-
lation of the insurance industry, and ERISA
was not intended to repeal that law. Congress
recognized that the two laws would overlap
in some areas, and it tried to clarify the con-
flicting jurisdictions. ERISA includes three
steps to determine which activities are sub-
ject to state law and which are preempted by
the federal statute:
1. Preemption. Congress preempted any
and all state laws that “relate to”
employee welfare benefit plans. That is,
employer-based plans would not be
subject to any state law relating to
them.1 1
2. The Savings Clause. To be consistent
with McCarran-Ferguson, Congress
“saved” (or exempted) from preemption
those state laws regulating the business
of insurance, even if the insurance com-
pany is providing benefits to an
employer.1 2
3. Deemer Provision. To make it clear that
the savings clause applied only to insur-
ance companies, and not employers,
Congress “deemed” that employers who
provide benefits to their own employees
are not engaged in the business of
insurance.1 3
When ERISA was enacted there was very
little “managed care.” Health plans’ second-
guessing medical decisions was not an issue.
The typical dispute was about enforcing the
terms of a contract—if a health plan failed to
pay for a covered benefit, employees could go
to federal court to recover the cost of the
denied claim, plus attorney’s fees. With that
remedy available, there seemed to be little
need for access to the state courts. This par-
ticular provision did not become controver-
sial until the growth of managed care and
the advent of “medical necessity.” A managed
care plan may refuse to pay for a service that
it considers not medically necessary. In
making that judgment, it is not violating the
terms of its contract, but it may very well be
guilty of making a mistaken judgment that
results in injury to the patient. This is a tort,






ERISA is complex, and the activities
addressed affect vast amounts of money and
create conflicts between well-organized par-
ties with vital interests at stake in how the
provisions are interpreted. Small wonder,
then, that there has been a steady succession
of court decisions trying to clarify the mean-
ing of the law.
The Courts
The Supreme Court has tried to clarify
the scope of ERISA with a number of deci-
sions, including those in the landmark cases
of Union Labor Life v. Pireno (1982),1 4 Shaw v.
Delta Airlines (1983),1 5 Metropolitan v.
Massachusetts (1985),1 6and Pilot Life v. Dedeaux
(1987).1 7 Additional cases are pending or
working their way through the court system. 
The Union Labor Life decision was espe-
cially important because it clarified what is
“the business of insurance” and therefore
“saved” for state regulation. The Court
reached back to the McCarran-Ferguson Act
of 1946, and said that 
three criteria have been used to deter-
mine whether a practice falls under
the “business of insurance” for pur-
poses of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act:
“[F]irst, whether the practice
(being addressed by the law) has the
effect of transferring or spreading a
policyholder’s risk; second, whether
the practice is an integral part of the
policy relationship between the
insurer and the insured; and third,
whether the practice is limited to
entities within the insurance indus-
try.”1 8
Applying those criteria, the Court ruled
in Metropolitan Life that a state benefit
mandate on insurance company contracts
(such as those requiring coverage of sub-
stance abuse or mental health services) is
saved from preemption because it (1) affects
the policyholder’s risk, (2) is integral to the
policy relationship, and (3) is limited to
insurance companies. 
In the Shaw decision, the Court ruled that
the preemption of state laws that “relate to”
an employee benefit plan is very broad and
includes any law that “has connection with
or reference to such plan.” In Pilot Life it
ruled that state contract laws are preempted
even for fully insured plans, because, although
they may affect the policy relationship, they
do not affect the transfer of risk and are not
limited to insurance entities.
Those rulings are only a few in the long
history of case law surrounding ERISA.
Virtually every aspect of the statute has been
litigated over the 25 years since it was adopt-
ed, and as health care financing changes and
state and federal law evolves, many more
cases will come under judicial review.1 9
The result has been that self-funded
employer plans have been given remarkable
advantages over the fully insured plans on
which small groups usually rely, and all
employer plans have even greater advantages
over individual insurance. State regulations
add significant costs to the provision of health
benefits and make coverage less affordable.
The compliance costs associated with keeping
up with ever-changing state laws and regu-
lations can be a major hurdle for companies
in the small group and individual insurance
markets—costs that self-funded employers are
allowed to escape.
Private-Sector Effects
The immediate practical effect of ERISA
was to exempt employer-sponsored health
plans from any and all state regulations—pre-
mium taxes, solvency requirements, mandat-
ed benefits, appeals and grievance proce-
dures, and assessments for state risk pools
and guaranty funds. Insurance companies
continued to be subject to those laws, so if an
employer purchased coverage from an insur-
er, the employer was also subject to them











a way to avoid complying, however. If the
employer “self-funded,”2 0 or “self-insured,”
benefits, it would not be purchasing coverage
from an insurer and would be completely
exempt from all those requirements. 
This exemption from state law did not
attract much attention at the time ERISA
was passed because, other than premium
taxes and solvency requirements, the states
had not yet enacted many of those require-
ments. In 1974 there were no subsidized
high-risk pools for health insurance,21 only
eight states had adopted guaranty funds for
life and health insurance,2 2 and there was
only a handful of mandated benefit laws on
the books.2 3
A bigger motivation for employers to self-
fund their health benefits in the mid-1970s
was to gain control over the investment and
income of reserves at a time of extremely high
interest rates and inflation. Many employers
were skeptical that insurance companies were
sharing the benefits of those investments
with them. Also, at a time when national health
care spending was increasing 13 to 15 percent
each year (1974–77),24 some employers ques-
tioned whether health insurance companies
were serious about reducing health care infla-
tion. The head of one self-insured manufac-
turing company told Congress, “When we
were insured, the insurer got paid a percent-
age of the claims paid. They had no interest
in holding down costs.”2 5
As the states enacted more insurance laws,
including more than 1,000 mandated bene-
fits, risk pools in half the states, guaranty
funds in almost all the states, and a host of
other regulations, employers became increas-
ingly grateful for the escape hatch ERISA
provided. When inflation eased in the 1980s,
employers continued to move to self-funding
to avoid compliance with all of the other new
requirements.
Current Issues in ERISA
In recent years, consumer advocates have
become alarmed that ERISA precludes
employees from using state contract and tort
law to redress grievances with their health
plans. That concern is especially acute in
managed care situations in which the plan
may override the recommendations of an
attending physician and deny coverage of a
procedure for lack of medical necessity. The
remedy for a wrongfully denied claim under
ERISA is limited to recovery of the cost of
the procedure, plus attorney’s fees. Unlike
state tort law, there is no provision for puni-
tive or compensatory damages.
In evaluating those issues and concerns,
it is important to sort out the facts from the
mythology. Many people believe that only
self-funded employer plans are exempt from
state contract law. Many others believe that
HMOs and other managed care entities are
more advantaged than are fee-for-service
plans. Many people think ERISA prevents
health plans from being sued for the wrong-
ful practice of medicine. But, none of those
beliefs is true. 
• All employer plans are ERISA plans
(except those run by churches or units of
government).26 It doesn’t matter what
size the employer is. It doesn’t matter if
the employer is self-funded, fully insured,
or anything in between. They are all
exempt from state contract and most
tort laws. 
• Plans that self-fund are also exempt
from state insurance laws (such as pre-
mium taxes and mandated benefits),
while insured plans are subject to those
laws indirectly—but only because the
insurance company is subject to them.
• Self-funding is only marginally related
to the size of the employer. There remain
many very large companies that pur-
chase coverage from insurance compa-
nies, and there are firms with as few as
25 employees that self-fund. There is
also a host of arrangements in between—
partial self-funding, self-funding with
stop-loss, and self-funding for indemni-
ty but not for HMO coverage.












less likely to be self-funded than are em-
ployers with fee-for-service (FFS), pre-
ferred provider organizations (PPO), or
point-of-service (POS) coverage. Thus,
HMOs are far more likely to be regulated
by the states than are other kinds of
plans (Table 1).2 7
• Because an increasing proportion of
employer plans use HMOs, the level of
self-funding of health benefits has actu-
ally decreased in recent years.2 8
• HMOs are no more exempt from state
contract law than are fee-for-service plans.
They are all exempt when they are part
of an employer benefit plan.
• HMOs are generally subject to most of
the state regulations that apply to tradi-
tional insurers, including mandated
benefits, solvency requirements, premi-
um taxes, appeals and grievance proce-
dures, and plain language requirements. 
• ERISA does not affect the right of the
states to regulate the practice of medi-
cine. The states are free to decide who
may and who may not practice medicine
and to define what the practice of medi-
cine is and what remedies are available
for the malpractice of medicine.
Managed Care and 
Malpractice
Many of the current complaints about
managed care plans, and HMOs especially,
are less about contract violations than they
are about quality of care. If an HMO has a
contract that states it will pay only for care
that it determines is “medically necessary,”
it has not violated the terms of its contract
when it denies coverage for a procedure it
believes is unnecessary. However, it may be
liable for medical malpractice if a patient is
harmed as a result of its decision. If the
HMO assumes the responsibility for decid-
ing what is and is not appropriate medical
treatment, it should also be held accountable
when it makes a wrong decision.
The usual reply from the health plan is
that the decision not to pay for treatment is
different from the decision not to provide
the treatment, and the patient can still
receive the care by paying for it directly.
That argument is unpersuasive for several
reasons: (1) If it is a staff-model HMO in
which the physicians are employed by the
plan, the physicians are accountable direct-
ly to their employer and are unlikely to defy
the plan’s decision. (2) Even a network
HMO, which contracts with a select panel
of physicians and hospitals, has far more
influence over physician practice than does
a traditional fee-for-service indemnity plan.
A network physician who defies the plan’s
policy may soon find himself de-networked.
(3) More important, when it comes to
major surgical procedures, the decision not
to pay is a decision not to treat. It would be
unreasonable to expect the patient to pay
for such a procedure out of his or her own
6











Percentage of Employer Plans That Are Self-Funded (500+ employees)
Year FFS Plans (%) PPO Plans (%) POS Plans (%) HMO Plans (%)
1995 70 71 47 na
1996 70 72 52 6
1997 72 73 46 10
Source: Joanne Wojcik, “Self-Insurance Sees Gains in Health Plan Financing,” Business Insurance,
February 16, 1998, p. 3 et seq.
Note: na = not applicable.
funds—after all, the primary purpose of
having an insurance plan is to cover rare
conditions, treatment of which would oth-
erwise be unaffordable.
Physicians who accept responsibility for
treatment decisions are accountable for
their errors. Health plans that assume some
of the responsibility for treatment decisions
should also be held accountable. But mak-
ing health plans subject to malpractice
remedies is not a federal responsibility, nor
is it unachievable today. The general ERISA
preemption of state tort lawsuits has appar-
ently not preempted malpractice torts.
Physicians are subject to malpractice reme-
dies irrespective of whether the patient’s
bills are paid by an employer, and an HMO
that is viewed as practicing medicine
should be similarly liable. Georgia, Texas,
and California have already enacted legisla-
tion clarifying that patients may file mal-
practice actions against their health plans.
Even without additional state action, the
courts are holding health plans liable for
malpractice. The Illinois Supreme Court
recently ruled that the family of a woman
who died after being denied a diagnostic
test by her health plan could proceed with a
malpractice suit against the plan.29 An Ohio
jury awarded $51.5 million to the estate of
a woman who died after her health plan
refused to pay for chemotherapy.3 0 And the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a
state court action suing an HMO for the
death of a two-day-old child who was
denied an extended hospital stay could pro-
ceed.3 1 The court said “[P]atients enjoy the
right to be free from medical malpractice
regardless of whether . . . care is provided
through an ERISA plan.”3 2
Whether ERISA preempts malpractice
suits against health plans will ultimately be
decided by the Supreme Court, but the
weight of the lower court decisions appears
to indicate that it does not. If the Supreme
Court decides otherwise ,  i t  wil l  be
interest ing to see how the Court distin-
guishes the liability of doctors from the lia-
bility of the health plans that employ them.
ERISA on the Block
It may very well be time to repeal ERISA.
It was enacted 25 years ago at a time of
increasing centralization of authority in the
federal government, and a time when the
states were viewed by Congress as obstruc-
tions to progressive government. Today
there is much more interest in decentraliza-
tion and deregulation in all areas of govern-
ment and industry. 
The basic premise of ERISA—that employ-
ers should provide nationally uniform bene-
fits—is suspect in any event. National and
international employers are capable of recog-
nizing variations in employment markets
when it comes to wages and other benefits
(subsidized parking, for instance). Complying
with local benefit requirements should be no
more difficult. Part of the reason the states
have enacted so many mandated benefits and
other insurance regulations is that large self-
funded employers were indifferent to them.
Subjecting large employers, along with every-
body else, to those laws could force state leg-
islatures to be more careful about enacting
new requirements.
But the current debate over patients’
rights is not about repealing ERISA. Quite
the opposite. Most of the proposals would
extend the federal reach. They would replace
state oversight of HMOs with a plethora of
new federal requirements covering such
things as quality control measures, payment
for emergency procedures, which specialties
may be used as primary care physicians, and
appeals and grievance procedures. Even the
notion that Congress could instruct the
states to apply malpractice remedies to
health plans is unprecedented. If Congress
can dictate the use of state medical mal-
practice remedies, can federal oversight of
the practice of medicine be far behind? 
The fact that ERISA has not kept up with
the times and continues to be based on the
health care financing conditions that existed
25 years ago should give pause to people
who support additional federal regulations















ly impossible to change it, but the financing
of health care is changing rapidly. HMOs are
already revising the way they control costs
because of experience and market demands.
New federal legislation could freeze into place
the kind of health care we have today and
inhibit the evolution of newer, more respon-
sive approaches.
Conclusion
ERISA prevents employees from suing
their health plans under state contract law
and from collecting punitive damages in fed-
eral court. But ERISA does not treat man-
aged care any differently than any other type
of health plan. And “fixing ERISA” will affect
all health plans, not just HMOs. 
Remedies for managed care’s interference
with the practice of medicine already exist, and
they are not likely to be improved by additional
federal legislation. Indeed, the groups that have
been supporting “anti-managed care” legisla-
tion in Congress may want to reconsider
whether they really want the regulation of
medicine to become a federal responsibility.
Once Congress begins to determine what
sort of health plan should be subject to mal-
practice remedies, can a federal definition of
what is an appropriate remedy be far behind?
If Congress determines who is and is not
“practicing medicine,” how long will it be
until the federal government starts to issue
licenses to engage in that practice?
Federal laws are very hard to change. A law
that is enacted today, based on the market
conditions that currently exist, could freeze
into place the very sort of intrusive health
care arrangement that patients’ rights advo-
cates complain about. Such a law could keep
new, patient-centered health plans from ever
being invented. That could be the ironic
result of this legislative malpractice.
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